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There is a significant body of research on children's preconceptions concerning 
scientific concepts and the impact this has upon their science education. One 
active issue concerns the extent to which young children's explanations for the 
existence of natural kinds rely on a teleological rationale: for example, rain is for 
watering the grass, or tigers’ stripes are for camouflage. It has been argued that 
this teleological tendency hampers children's ability to learn about causality in 
the natural world. This paper investigates two factors (question wording and 
topic) which it is argued have led to a misestimation of children's teleological 
tendencies within the area natural phenomena: i.e., those that are time-
constrained, natural events or process such as snow, clouds or night. Sixty-six (5- 
to 8-years-old) children took part in a repeated-measures experiment, answering 
both open- and leading-questions across 10 topics of natural phenomena. The 
findings indicate that children's teleological reasoning may have been 
overestimated as open question forms significantly reduced their tendency to 
answer teleologically. Moreover, the concept of teleology is more nuanced than 
often suggested. Consequently, young children may be more able to learn about 
causal explanations for the existence of natural phenomena than the literature 
implies. 
Keywords: teleology; teleological explanation; natural phenomena; young 
children 
Introduction 
Teleological explanations are those which indicate that something exists for a specific 
purpose (e.g. rain is for watering the grass, puddles are for jumping in, scissors are for 
cutting paper). With regard to the natural world these types of teleological explanations 
can imply a purpose where there is none. For this reason, many have claimed the use of 
teleological explanation to be detrimental when children come to learn about causality 
in nature. For example, Hanke (2004, p.115) argues that the use of teleology is ‘lazy and 
wrong … a straitjacket for the mind, restricting truly creative scientific thinking’ and 
Kampourakis (2014, p.92) states that teleology is ’the most important obstacle to 
understanding evolution’. These concerns about the use of teleological explanations are 
echoed by many other researchers (e.g. Kelemen, 2012, Polling & Evans, 2002). 
This paper considers how others have investigated children’s preconceptions 
about the natural world, specifically natural phenomena (e.g. rainbows or night). 
Natural phenomena are investigated as while the appropriateness of teleological 
explanations for organisms and their traits (e.g. capybara or zebras’ stripes) is debated, 
there exists no such controversy for the existence of natural phenomena: teleology is 
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absolutely incorrect. Two factors are explored with regard to previous data collection 
methods: question wording and questioned topic. Question wording here relates to the 
manner in which a question is phrased, with the view that a question can be worded in a 
way which leads respondents into provided a certain type of response. Questioned topic 
refers to the subject of a question, that is, the type of natural phenomena which is under 
discussion (e.g. rain in the question: why is there rain?).  
It is argued that prior work has worded questions in a manner which could be 
considered leading towards a teleological answer and, at times, used a small number of 
questioned topics to explore children’s ideas. Consequently, it will be suggested that the 
way previous studies have been designed could have led to researchers misestimating 
children’s teleological tendency and research is needed to address that. Moreover, 
following consideration of philosophical debates about teleological explanations, rather 
than treating teleological explanations as a homogenous group, this paper considers 
types of teleological explanation, some of which do not follow the standard definition of 
teleology used in the literature. Lastly, it is argued that a teleological style of 
explanation may be due a fragmented (rather than coherent) structure of knowledge 
about the natural world. Overall, it is suggested that children’s use of teleological 
explanations may be more nuanced than currently indicated in the literature, and their 
use of such explanations to account for the existence of natural phenomena can be 
influenced by the design of the questions used to elicit their preconceptions. 
The extent of teleological explanations 
In a range of studies children, aged 3- to 10-years-old, have been shown to primarily 
provide teleological explanations to account for things in the natural world (e.g. 
Kampourakis, et al., 2012; Keil, 1995; Kelemen, 1999a, 2003). Kelemen argues that this 
tendency for children to provide teleological explanations to questions about things in 
the natural world means that children prescribe some form of intentional design to 
natural kinds, believing they exist for a purpose, to serve a function or to achieve a goal 
(Kelemen, 1999). Thus it can be considered that teleological explanation is indicative of 
a preconception that things in the natural world exist for a purpose. The term 
preconception is used here, rather than misconception, as these are children’s ideas 
before they have received formal education, on such matters as causality in the natural 
world. Therefore, these ideas are not considered to be misconceptions as children have 
not be taught the scientifically-consistent conception. Children’s preconceptions can be 
particularly difficult for teachers to change (Peacock et al., 2011). Consequently, 
evidence indicating that children have a preference for teleological explanations is a 
cause of concern for educators.  
Research into children’s teleological explanations usually investigates a number 
of categories (what constitutions a category is returned to later). The categorised used in 
literature are wholes and parts of organisms (rhinos or rhinos’ horns), natural objects 
(clouds or points on rocks) and artefacts (hammers or watches’ hands). Although, 
teleological explanations for the existence of artefacts are correct and therefore not an 
educational problem, they are investigated in literature as a benchmark for teleological 
explanation (i.e. as artefacts should have teleological rationales, if children provide 
similar numbers of teleological explanation for artefacts and, for example, organisms 
then this could indicate a teleological view of organisms). 
Investigation by categories (e.g. organisms and natural objects) has resulted in 
two competing theories about how children apply teleology. Children are viewed as 
either being selective in their application of teleology, only applying it to certain groups 
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of topics, artefacts and organisms’ traits (Kampourakis et al., 2012; Keil, 1995), or 
promiscuous, applying it to anything and everything (Kelemen, 1999a, 2012). 
Evidence for the selective nature of teleological reasoning comes from an early 
study on children’s teleological explanations. Keil (1992, 1995) presented children, 
aged 5- to 7-years-old, with explanations for the categories of natural objects and 
organisms. The questions asked children to choose between a causal (a scaled-down 
scientific) explanation or a teleological explanation. For topics in the category of 
organisms and artefacts children primarily chose teleological explanations, suggesting 
they believe organisms and their appendices serve a specific purpose. However, for 
topics of natural objects children preferred the causal explanations. This, Keil claims, 
indicated children are selective in applying teleology and do not attribute purpose to 
natural objects or phenomena.  
The proposal that teleological reasoning is only prevalent within the categories 
of organisms and artefacts was challenged by Kelemen (1999a). Four- and five-year-
olds were asked what is X for? for 12 topics across three categories (artefacts, natural 
objects and organisms). The aim of her study was to explore whether children attribute 
purpose to different categories in a selective or promiscuous manner, as detailed above. 
Therefore, while the focus was children’s teleological explanations, the goal was to 
survey the scope of their thinking not to elicit solely teleological responses. Participants 
provided teleological rationales for artefacts (~65% of responses), organisms (~55%) 
and natural objects (~65%, means taken from graph, Kelemen, 1999a, Fig 1 & 2); 
therefore, suggesting that young children prescribe purpose to all types of category, a 
notion dubbed, by Kelemen, promiscuous teleology. 
In a second study, within Kelemen (1999a), 4- and 5-year-olds were presented 
with hypothetical scenarios, using the same categories as above. Each scenario 
comprised of an individual stating that the topic X was intended for a specific task, 
while another individual claimed that although X could be used for a certain task it was 
not specifically intended for that task. The results supported the original study, 
participants chose the teleological option ~85% of the time for artefacts, ~80% for 
organisms and ~75% for natural objects, (means taken from graph, Kelemen, 1999a, Fig 
3); therefore, providing further evidence for the children's "promiscuous" application of 
teleology. The prevalence of promiscuous-teleology across a wider age-range is 
supported by additional studies (Kelemen, 1999b; 2003) where 6- to 10-year-olds chose 
multiple-choice options which prescribed function to the appendages of organisms and 
natural objects, although teleological explanation did slightly decrease with age.  
More recent research investigating 5- to 8-year-olds teleological reasoning 
(Kampourakis et al., 2012) explored children's explanations topic in the same three 
categories (organisms, natural objects and artefacts). Children provided teleological 
rationales for the organisms and artefacts; however, for natural objects, teleological 
explanations were limited and decreased significantly with age. Kampourakis et al. 
proposed that this decrease between Reception and Year 2 shows a tendency for 
children to move from promiscuous-teleology to selective-teleology as they age. It is 
debatable how, and if, children move from a promiscuous-teleology to selective-
teleology as they age, but it is evident that as children develop their propensity to 
provide teleological rationales across-categories decreases. 
Measuring teleological explanations 
The studies outlined above suggest that teleological explanations are used by children to 
account for the existence of organisms and at times for natural objects and phenomena. 
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However, examination of the methods used in these studies suggests that number of 
teleological explanations provided by children may have been overestimated. Firstly, by 
using leading questions and, secondly, though the selection of questioned topics. 
The often-cited paper by Kelemen (1999a) asked what is X for? The word for 
implies a purpose and so questions phrased in this manner could inadvertently lead 
children into explaining the topic's existence teleologically, due to demand 
characteristics, which result in biased data as the participant attempts to provide answers 
that the interviewer may want to hear (Orne, 1962). This use of potentially misleading 
questions is reminiscent of the Piaget-Donaldson debate, typified when McGarrigle and 
Donaldson (1974) reframed a number of potentially misleading tasks used by Piaget 
(1952) to assess conservation, the reframed tasks showed a considerable increase in 
children’s ability. Consequently, data gathered using, e.g. what is X for, may provide an 
unrepresentative picture of children’s teleological explanations.  
Consideration of the question wordings used in previous studies (Kampourakis 
et al., 2012; Keil, 1995; Kelemen, 1999a, 1999b; Polling & Evans, 2002; Tao, Oliver, & 
Venville, 2011) shows that there are two main forms of question wording: is the 
question-subject (X) for something and if so what, and, why does the question-subject 
(Y) have this appendage (X). These two question types, is the question-subject for 
something and if so what and why does the question-subject have this appendage (i.e. 
what is the purpose of a certain appendage?), are effectively the same generic leading-
question format: what is X for?, a question format which seeks to inquire about the 
purpose of X.  
Kelemen (1999a) does suggest that what is X for? could be leading, but 
maintains that further research using fixed choice options, between teleological and 
scientific explanations, negates the error and supports the findings. However, it is 
argued that fixed choice options do not measure what a child actually thinks only which 
of two options they prefer, or even which of two options they dislike least. 
Kampourakis et al. (2012) expand upon this arguing that when researching children’s 
actual ideas, rather than their forced-preferences, open-questions are a necessity. 
Regarding the influence of questioned topic, the studies described above often 
use limited topics to account for children’s reasoning within a category. Keil (1992, 
1995) used a generic green plant and emeralds to represent children’s reasoning about 
all topics within the categories of organisms and natural objects. It seems unlikely that 
an entire category can be represented by a single topic. Other studies have used more 
topics to represent a category but the range of topics may not constitute a representative 
sample. 
Kelemen (1999a) found a broad application of teleology across category. The 
category of organisms explored fourteen topics, a reasonable number, however, the 
category of artefacts only included six topics and only two topics were used to assess 
reasoning about natural objects. This appears a disproportionate split of questioned 
topics, especially when considering the use of only two topics to propose a theory shift 
from selective- to promiscuous-teleology. Follow up studies by Kelemen (1999b, 2003) 
also used a small number of questioned topics: four organisms and four natural objects. 
Furthermore, research by Kampourakis et al. (2012), a quasi-replication of Kelemen 
(1999b, 2003) only explored two topics to represent each of the categories of organisms, 
artefacts and natural objects. Again it seems apparent that two topics cannot measure 
children’s reasoning about a whole category. In Kampourakis et al. (2012) there was 
limited evidence for teleological reasoning in the category of natural objects. However, 
for children of a similar age Tao et al. (2011) found evidence of 8- to 9-year-olds 
provided teleological rationales for the Sun, Moon and seasons, which are examples of 
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natural objects and phenomena). These findings suggest that within-category 
investigation is needed to properly assess children’s teleological explanations, as 
collapsing topics across-category may hide within-category variation. 
Although the use of categories is common, how categories are formed is not 
discussed. However, classifying topics in this manner has commonalities with work by 
Chi. In her framework everything can be placed within a number of ontological 
categories. There are three main overarching categories, called ontological trees: 
entities, processes and mental states. Each ontological tree has a number of 
subcategories, which in turn have more subcategories. Everything can be placed in a 
certain category, within a certain tree. Depending upon the granularity of categorisation, 
this category could be a broad category (e.g. dachshund placed within organisms) or a 
highly defined subcategory which has numerous parent levels (e.g. dachshund placed 
within dogs, within mammals, within animals, within organisms, within entities). . 
Placing a new topic within a tree results in it inheriting the qualities of the ontological 
category, categorised topics are considered static unless there is robust conceptual 
change (Chi, 2008).  
While it is not certain that previous research has used Chi’s framework for 
classification by ontological category, the structuring of categories shares similar 
features and provides a rationale for future exploration. Chi’s classification system is 
used in this paper as a) it provides a method of bounding research into natural kinds and 
b) it is a convention of research into teleological explanation, so abandoning this 
framework would make comparisons to earlier work ineffectual. Using Chi’s 
ontological categories indicates that a distinction is needed between natural objects (e.g. 
rocks) and natural phenomena (e.g. wind), in previous work these categories have been 
collapsed into one category, often called natural objects. Chi’s work would suggest that 
natural objects are placed in the ontological tree of entities (tangible objects), whereas, 
natural phenomena are within the ontological tree of process (events which occur over 
time). This paper maintains this distinction, treating the two as separate categories. 
Types and acceptability of teleological explanations 
Teleological explanations are those that explain the existence of something in relation to 
an outcome or purpose it serves. A number of authors have attempted to classify 
different types of teleological explanations. Combining previously used sub-
classifications indicates four sub-categories of teleological explanation; these are 
displayed in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Types of teleology arising from literature 
Category Explanation Relevant literature 
Design-
teleology 
A topic is explained in relation to a purpose or goal 
for which it was designed. The topic has the 
singular purpose of aiding/supporting something, 
the something can be itself or another entity; it acts 
upon an entity to produce a result which is not a 
scientifically valid. For example, ‘Rain is for 
watering the plants' or 'day is for waking up the 
birds' 
Woodfield, 1979; 
Zohar & Ginossar, 
1998; Kelemen 
1999a Polling & 
Evans, 2002. 
Religious-
teleology (a 
subcategory of 
design-
teleology) 
This is a specific type of design-teleology. A topic 
is explained in relation to a purpose or goal for 
which it was designed, however, a god or other 
supernatural being is invoked to designer of the 
topic. For example, ‘there is a storm because god is 
angry’ 
Woodfield, 1979; 
Kelemen & 
DiYanni, 2003; 
Lindeman, 
Svedholm-
Hakkinen, & 
Lipsanen, 2015 
Functional-
teleology 
 
A topic is explained in relation to a function that it 
performs, within a system, or a goal which it 
pursues. What is paramount is that the function or 
goal is appropriate for the topic. The topic can be 
explained scientifically using teleological language. 
It is an appropriate teleological explanation. For 
example, ‘an eagle’s wings are for flying’.  
Woodfield, 1979; 
Zohar & Ginossar, 
1998; Kelemen, 
2012 
 
Relational-
teleology 
A topic is explained in relation to a purpose for 
which it can be used or an effect which the topic 
causes. The purpose or effect is human-centric. For 
example, ‘snow is used by children for making 
snowmen' or 'night is a time period which people 
usually use for going to sleep' 
ojalehto, Waxman 
& Medin, 2013; 
Olson, 2003 
 
The use of teleological explanations has long been seen as problematic by some 
philosophers of science (Ruse, 1989). Considering the objections to teleology explored 
in this section and the types of teleological explanations shown in Table 1 the position 
that teleology is problematic refers specifically to the use design-teleology and its 
subcategory of religious-teleology. Design-teleology is argued to be a debilitating factor 
which restricts truly creative scientific thinking (Hanke, 2004), because it places the 
focus on purposes, resulting in children having the misconception that natural kinds 
have a teleological rationale. 
Design-teleological thinking is considered by Kampourakis (2014) to be the 
main conceptual barrier in understanding evolution, as individuals confuse artefact 
inspired design-teleology with organism functional-teleology. For example, a child may 
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apply their conceptual framework about artefacts (that they have a creator and are 
designed for a purpose) to the development of an organisms’ trait, such as rhinos’ horns. 
Thus resulting in a view that rhino’s horns serve a purpose (functional-teleology) but 
also that they are designed by a creator to serve that purpose (design-teleology). A 
preconception that organisms and their traits are designed can lead to problems when 
learning about evolution, as such preconceptions are highly resistant to change. 
The use of teleological explanation in relation to organisms and biological traits 
is debated. Briefly, opponents argue that it should not be used or can be misleading (see 
Hanke, 2004; Kampourakis, 2014) whereas proponents suggests that functional-
teleological explanations are a necessity to discussions about evolution (see Amundson 
& Lauder, 1994; Ruse 1989). These arguments typical come from philosophy of science 
or psychology. However, research in the field of science education indicates that high 
school students can, and do, use teleological explanations for biological concepts, 
without sacrificing scientific rigour (Zohar & Ginossar, 1998); essentially using 
teleology as a cultural method of describing rather than a stand-alone explanation.  
Some teleological explanations may arise because children conflate cause with 
effect (Olson, 2003); for example, she put her hood up because it was raining (causal) 
with it was raining because she put her hood up (effect). This is supported by the 
relational-deictic framework (ojalehto et al., 2013), which suggests that when children 
provide teleological responses they are not stating that a topic has a designed purpose 
(design-teleology) but merely relating the topic to a purpose (or multiple purposes) for 
which it can be used, or an effect that it causes (e.g., how children use snow for making 
snowballs). This form of explanation is further referred to as relational-teleology. As the 
paper by ojalehto et al. is theoretical it provides no empirical evidence about the number 
of teleological explanations which are relational-teleology, nor if children are even 
expressing this type of teleology.  
However, if children show a preference for relational-teleology this would mean 
that their teleological explanations are not based on the belief that a topic is designed for 
a specific purpose, but rather are discussing the topic in relation to a purpose for which 
it could be used. This would indicate that some teleological explanations may result 
from patterns of language and so may be limited though developing children’s 
understanding of appropriate styles of explanation for scientific contexts.  
Constructing teleology 
As teleology is a style of explanation that results from the naïve idea that nature has 
purpose, it is worth considering how this naïve idea is constructed. Is it coherent 
(knowledge-as-theory, see Ioannides & Vosniadou, 2002) or fragmented (knowledge-
in-pieces, see diSessa, Gillespie & Esterly 2004). These two stances on individuals’ 
conceptions have different origins and implications for supporting conceptual change. 
The coherent view of naïve ideas argues that they are part of structured concepts 
which cannot be isolated but rather form a web of ideas (Amin, Smith & Wiser 2014). 
A key area of the debate surrounds the context in which children use certain naïve ideas 
(diSessa, 2014). Knowledge-as-theory implies that children’s intuitive ideas are limited 
in number and stable across numerous contexts (Amin et al., 2014). In a key paper 
Ioannides & Vosniadou (2002) found that children in similar age ranges provided a 
small number of similar explanations (naïve ideas) about the concept of force. This 
finding they propose indicates an explanatory framework that was consistently applied 
by individuals across contexts; therefore, demonstrating an explanatory system that 
displays considerable coherence.  
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Knowledge-in-pieces (diSessa, 2014) asserts that naïve ideas are a collection of 
fragments that combine when needed to form an idea. These fragments are often 
referred to as p-prims which are microgeneralisations that arise from individual’s 
experiences (diSessa et al., 2004). These p-prims cannot, by themselves, be considered 
objectively correct until they are combined by an individual in a certain context. That p-
prims may be combined differently across individuals and contexts, give rise to the 
principle that naïve ideas are numerous and variable, they will not be coherent across a 
group of students. Therefore, the fragmented stance suggests that children’s intuitive 
ideas will differ depending upon the context in which they are explaining, and when 
asked a question a certain group of children may provide a wide range of contradictory 
responses. In a quasi-replication of the aforementioned Ioannides & Vosniadou (2002), 
diSessa et al. (2004) showed that altering the context of questions resulted in a 
considerable departure from Ioannides & Vosniadou derived set of coherent ideas for 
physical forces: children’s naïve ideas varied considerably both within and across 
individuals.  
Consequently, this raises the question of whether children’s naïve ideas about 
the causes of natural phenomena comprise of a coherent theory or a collection of 
fragments. Answering this question involves exploring within-child variation across 
contexts and across-child variation across contexts (i.e. different topics within an 
ontological category). 
Purpose of study 
The argument that demand characteristics may influence children’s responses suggests 
that previous studies may be misleading due to wording questions in a teleological 
manner. This argument underpins the first research question, does question wording 
influence children's explanations about the existence of natural kinds? It is hypothesised 
that a teleologically leading question will produce more teleological responses than a 
neutrally worded question.  
Previous work has investigated only a small number of topics and not 
considered within-category variation. This begs the question, does questioned topic 
influences children's tendency to provide a teleological response? If there is substantial 
variation across topics then this has implications for a) theories that children’s 
teleological reasoning is “promiscuous”, and b) implies that caution is needed when 
interpreting results of studies that used a limited number of topics, and c) that 
explanations about the natural world may result from fragmented rather than coherent 
knowledge. 
This paper also investigates the types of teleology do children display when they 
provide teleological explanations to ascertain the proportion that are relational rather 
than design. If responses primarily display relational-teleology then children may not be 
suggesting a topic exists specifically for X, but rather referring to X in relation to 
something for which is could be used, or the reaction it causes in people. A broad 
tendency to use relational- over design-teleology would suggest that teleology is not the 
barrier it is claimed to be as relational-teleological explanations may result from natural 
patterns of language, not a fervent belief that nature has purpose. 
These three research questions are explored to evaluate the current positioning 
on children’s use of teleological explanations. That is, whether children’s use of 
teleology is robust and maintained across different contexts (i.e. question wording and 
questioned topic) and whether their explanations conform to the standard definition 
(design-teleology) or if their use of teleology is more complex. 
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Method 
Design 
A 2x2 within-subjects factorial design was used to test the influence of question 
wording on children’s explanations. The first factor, question wording, was within 
participants and had two levels: the open-treatment (why is there X?) and the leading-
treatment (what is x for?). As each child was asked both types of question, the second 
factor, treatment order, determined if their first question set comprising of either the 
leading- or open-questions:  i.e., half the children were randomly assigned to receive a 
block of open then leading questions whereas the other half had a block of leading then 
open questions. As each treatment consisted of five questions, during one interview 
with a break in the middle children were asked about ten topics, and so each participant 
received questions about the ten topics in a randomised order. As question set order and 
topic order were randomised separately, across the sample the topics were 
approximately split between the two treatments (e.g. half of the total questions about 
rain were asked using the leading-treatment).  
Material  
A preliminary study was conducted to identify suitable topics for discussion. The goal 
was to identify topics for which children could articulate a response irrespective of 
accuracy and so was not concerned with whether children’s responses were teleological 
or scientific. A wide pool of potential topic candidates was identified from previous 
studies (DiYanni & Kelemen, 2005; Kampourakis et al., 2012; Keil, 1995; Kelemen, 
1999a, 1999b; Piaget, 1929; Polling & Evans, 2002) along with additional topics 
generated from discussion with colleagues. 
Twelve 6- and 7-year-olds (female = 6) were interviewed in groups of four. 
They were asked why is/are there X? for 20 topics of natural objects and natural 
phenomena1. After consideration of participants’ responses, children’s opinions about 
question difficulty and interviewer observations, a number of these 20 possible topics 
were eliminated if children struggled to provide any form of response to the question. In 
particular, natural objects, such as rocks, proved particularly difficult for children to 
provide any response to, which is surprising considering the focus on natural objects in 
previous work (see Kelemen, 2003; Kampourakis et al., 2012). The use of such a 
generic question format may have failed to cue children to provide an etiological 
explanation for the formation of, for example, rocks, However, a targeted question such 
as how are rocks formed? would be considered an etiologically-leading question and be 
subject to the problems associated with leading-questions. Consequently, it was decided 
to focus only on topics of natural phenomena: darkness, day, light, night, rain, rainbows, 
snow, storms, waterfalls and waves. 
                                                
1 Natural objects included caves, icebergs, mountains, rocks, sand, soil, stars, the moon and the 
sun. Natural phenomena included darkness, day, light, night, rain, rainbows, snow, storms, 
waterfalls, waves and wind. 
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Participants 
The participants were 66 children, aged 5- to 8-years-old, recruited from three classes 
within the same primary school from a large city in the Midlands of the UK. This school 
is single-form entry, is judged to be performing well on national scales, and is above the 
national average for both pupils from minority ethnic groups and those entitled to free 
school meals. The sample consisted of 22 children from each of Year 1, Year 2 and 
Year 3 (M = 86 months, SD = 10.84, Female = 34). No child was classified as having 
Special Educational Needs or English as an Additional Language. 
Procedure 
Children were informed that the interview would be recorded and presented with the 
following statement: 
Some of these questions may be tricky but that’s OK, because people have 
different ideas about the answers. I think you might have some really good ideas 
and I just want to know what you think. Remember there are no right answers, it is 
just what you believe. If you’re not sure about an answer, just say, I don’t know, 
OK? 
This statement was included to discourage children from trying to guess a ‘correct’ 
answer.  
In individual 10-minute interviews, participants then received five questions 
using the leading-treatment or open-treatment, dependent upon treatment group. 
Following these questions, children played a short drawing game before resuming the 
interview with the five remaining questioned topics using the counterpart question 
wording. If children took a substantial amount of time to respond to a question the 
question was repeated, then were offered the choice to either ‘have some more thinking 
time or move onto the next question’. Interviews took place in a quiet communal area 
outside of the classrooms. The study was approved by the University's ethics board. 
Measures  
Children’s responses were coded on two levels. At Level 1, answers were coded as 
teleological, scientific and other (Table 2), and were used to explore the influence of 
question wording and questioned topic. At Level 2, teleological responses were sub-
classified to allow for investigation of the types of teleological explanations children 
provided (see also Table 1). 
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Table 2 
Coding rubric for children’s responses at level 1 
 Teleological (0) Scientific (1) Other (NA) 
Explanation The topic is given 
a purpose, a 
function or a goal, 
which aids or 
supports either 
itself or another 
entity. 
A scaled down, 
causal explanation 
for a topic, answer 
does not contain 
teleological notions. 
It may not be 
scientifically correct. 
Descriptive responses (participant 
provides a description of the 
topic), Non sequiturs (participants 
answer is an unrelated comment, it 
is not related to the topic), Don’t 
know (participants state they 
“don’t know” the answer or are 
“unsure”) or No answer 
(participant provides no response). 
Example ‘There are 
waterfalls so wild 
animals have a 
place to drink’ or 
'there is night to 
tell us to go to 
sleep’ 
'It snows because the 
clouds get cold and 
all smushed up 
together' 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst theoretically different, design-teleology and relational-teleology could 
prove difficult to distinguish, especially as there is no published coding scheme to 
differentiate the two. Linguistic analysis provides a method of solving this coding 
dilemma. Explanations employing design-teleology will have the topic as the subject of 
the answer, and the subject will be acting upon an object. For example, in the response 
rain is for watering the grass, the subject (rain) is acting on (watering) the object 
(grass). Conversely, relational-teleological explanations, those which account for the 
topic as something which an agent uses, will introduce an agent into the response via a 
subject complement (e.g. we or I) or implicitly adding an agent via a verb, which 
implies an agent (e.g. making or learning). For example, in the above statement, snow is 
for making snowmen, the subject complement (for making snowmen) implicitly implies 
an agent via the verb (making); therefore, the topic (snow) is used by an agent for a 
subjective purpose (making snowmen). 
To establish the extent of inter-rater reliability, 10% of the data, (66 responses) 
were coded by a second researcher. Cohen Kappa indicated a very good level of 
agreement (K = .885, p < .001 for Level 1 coding and K = .841, p < .001 for Level 2 
coding). 
ANCOVA was used to analyse the independent variables of question wording 
and treatment order, as it facilitated the analysis of the two experimental variables and a 
covariate: children’s age, which is known to be a factor influencing children’s use of 
teleological explanations. Cochran’s Q test was used to analyse the influence of 
questioned topic upon children’s responses, as this required a non-parametric test which 
allowed for the analyses of whether k = 10 treatments produced the same outcomes 
across participants (i.e. where children’s responses consistent across the ten question 
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topics). Chi-squared goodness-of-fit tests were used to explore differences in response 
type between the different treatments. 
Results 
Influence of question wording 
Overall, 69.2% of responses were teleological, with the leading-treatment questions 
eliciting 80.0% teleological responses and the open-treatment 58.4%. However, 72 
responses out of the possible 660 were coded at Level 1 as other, which were then 
removed from the data. This resulted in 588 valid responses to the 10 questions, 457 
(77.7%) of which were teleological and 131 (22.3%) were scientific. Examples of 
children’s teleological explanations for the ten topics investigated are detailed in the 
supplementary Tables 1 - 10. Splitting the data by treatment shows the leading-
treatment received in 264 (92.1%) teleological answers, whereas 193 (68.2%) 
teleological responses were given to the open-treatment.  
A 2x2 ANCOVA was conducted with the independent variables of question 
wording (leading- and open-treatment) and question set order (first question set-
Leading or first question set-Open). The dependent variable was the summed responses 
to the leading- and open-questions, resulting in a participant score of 0-5 for each 
treatment. The covariate was participants’ age in months, which was mean centred to 
avoid compromising the main effect. Means are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Mean percentage of scientific responses split by question wording and question set order 
 Percentage of scientific responses (SD) 
Question 
wording 
First question set-
Leading  
(n = 33) 
First question set-
Open  
(n = 33) 
Overall  
(n = 66) 
Leading 7.88% (15.76) 7.88% (12.18) 7.88% (13.97) 
Open 26.06% (26.68) 37.56% (33.07) 31.82% (30.37) 
 
Results indicate that question wording had a significant effect on children’s 
responses, F (1,63) = 44.57, p. < .001, ηp2 = .41, as a significantly greater number of 
teleological responses were given in the leading-treatment condition (92.1%) than in the 
open-treatment (68.2%). Participant age also predicted responses: older children 
provided fewer teleological answers, F (1,63) = 4.40, p. = .041, ηp2 = .06, although there 
was no interaction between question wording and age, F (1,63) = 0.01, p. = .962, ηp2 < 
.01. Question set order did not significantly influence responses, F (1,63) = 1.72, p. = 
.179, ηp2 = .02, nor was there a significant interaction between question wording and 
question set order, F (1,63) = 2.59, p. = .093, ηp2 = .04. The test results suggest that 
children were not primed to provide teleological or scientific responses if the first 
question set they received was leading- or open-treatment, respectively. 
Influence of topic 
The proportion of scientific responses varied between the topics ranging from 12.5% for 
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waterfalls to 75.0% for rainbows. Cochran's Q test was used to investigate if there was a 
difference in the amount of teleological responses for the ten topics. Due to missing data 
(those coded as other), this test was conducted with a sample size of n = 34. The results 
suggest that there is a significant difference between the responses provided to ten 
topics, Q (9) = 33.29, p. < .001, ηQ2 = .11. However, this data set is biased due to the 
significant influence of the leading question wording therefore, further investigation is 
conducted with data pertaining to only the open question wording as the more neutral 
condition.  
To investigate if certain topics received more teleological (or scientific) 
responses than other topics, ten (one per topic) chi square goodness-of-fit tests were 
used. As previous work has only investigated a limited number of topics, there is no 
published work that can be used to predict the effect of topic on response type (the split 
of teleological to scientific responses). Consequently, the expected value was set to the 
weighted-mean number of teleological and scientific responses (for the open-treatment) 
across the ten topics from this study (.624: .376), which is a conservative method as a 
topic is being compared against an average which includes itself. Thus, this analysis can 
identify which (if any) topic deviates from this average. Crammer's V (φc) is provided 
as a measure of effect size with the results shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Goodness-of-fit test results for response type by question topic 
  
  
Percentage of responses 
   
Topic n 
Teleological 
response 
Scientific 
response χ2  (df = 1) p. φc 
Darkness 29 69.0% 31.0% 0.53 .465 0.14 
Day 31 74.2% 25.8% 1.84 .175 0.24 
Light 33 72.7% 27.3% 1.50 .220 0.21 
Night 33 81.8% 18.2% 2.44 .118 0.27 
Rain 30 63.3% 36.7% 0.01 .915 0.02 
Rainbows 28 25.0% 75.0% 16.68 .001 0.77 
Snow 38 68.4% 31.6% 0.59 .443 0.12 
Storms 25 32.0% 68.0% 9.84 .002 0.63 
Waterfalls 32 87.5% 12.5% 8.60 .003 0.52 
Waves 18 50.0% 50.0% 1.18 .278 0.26 
 
The results show that the observed values for rainbows, storms and waterfalls 
are significantly different to the mean responses for the ten topics. Rainbows and storms 
resulted in less teleological responses than the average, whereas waterfalls resulted in 
children providing more teleological explanations than the average value for the ten 
topics. 
Type of teleology 
Coding the teleological responses at Level 2 resulted in 133 responses displaying 
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design-teleology and 324 indicating relational-teleology. The percentage scores for type 
of teleology advocated indicates an approximate 3:7 split for design-teleology vs 
relational-teleology (29.1% vs 70.9%). 
To further investigate this preference for relational-teleology, as above2, ten (one 
per topic) chi-square goodness-of-fit tests were used to determine any preference for 
response type (design-teleology or relational-teleology) for each topic. Again due to the 
bias associated with the leading-treatment only the responses to the open treatment were 
used. As there is no published work that can be used to predict the type of teleology 
children are espousing, the expected values were set using the weighted-mean levels of 
design- and relational-teleology (.350: .650). Results are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Goodness-of-fit test results for type of teleology by question topic 
  
  Percentage of responses    
Topic n 
Design-
teleology 
Relational-
teleology 
χ2  (df = 
1)     p. φc 
Darkness 20 20.0% 80.0% 1.99 .158 0.32 
Day 23 4.3% 95.7% 9.52 .002 0.64 
Light 24 12.5% 87.5% 5.36 .021 0.47 
Night 27 14.8% 85.2% 4.86 .028 0.42 
Rain 19 52.6% 47.4% 2.58 .108 0.37 
Rainbows 7 42.9% 57.1% 0.19 .665 0.16 
Snow 26 26.9% 73.1% 7.93 .005 0.55 
Storms 8 100.0% 0.0% 14.83 .001 1.36 
Waterfalls 28 32.1% 67.9% 0.10 .747 0.06 
Waves 9 44.4% 55.6% 0.35 .555 0.20 
 
The results show that the observed values for day, light, night, snow and storms 
are significantly different to the mean. Teleological explanations for storms showed a 
preference for design- over relational-teleology, whereas, day, light, night and snow 
mirrored the overall mean preference for relational-teleology but with a higher 
proportion of responses than the weighted-mean. 
Discussion 
This study had three aims, to investigate 1) the influence of question wording on 
children's tendencies to provide teleological explanations about the existence of natural 
phenomena, 2) the influence of questioned topic within the category of natural 
phenomena, on children's propensity to provide teleological rationales, and 3) the type 
                                                
2 Due to data coded as other and the removal of scientific responses, Cochran's Q test was not 
appropriate due to loss of sample size. However, each topic could be explored 
independently. 
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of teleology, design or relational, that children use to account for natural phenomena. 
Before addressing these questions, a clear finding is that regardless of question wording, 
questioned topic and age, children demonstrated a considerable inclination to provide 
teleological explanations for natural phenomena. The following explores the findings 
pertaining to the three research questions and the implications arising. 
Influence of question wording 
The data support the hypothesis that question wording influences children’s responses 
to questions about scientific topics. Children provided a significantly large number of 
teleological responses (91.4%) to leading questions (what is X for?), whereas the open 
questions (why is there X?) received only 64.3% teleological answers. Therefore, 
questions phrased using teleological-language can exacerbate children’s strong 
tendency to provide purposeful explanations for questions about natural phenomena. 
There was no significant interaction between question wording and question set order, 
although the partial-eta shows a small effect size. There does appear to be a trend that 
children who received the leading-treatment first to provide lower levels of scientific 
responses when they received the open-treatment. This possible trend would have made 
the hypothesis test more conservative. Older children provided fewer teleological and 
more scientific responses, supporting findings by Kelemen (1999b, 2003) and 
Kampourakis et al. (2012). However, regardless of age, participants predominantly 
provided teleological responses to the leading-treatment, while the open-treatment 
question received fewer teleological and more scientific answers. Consequently, leading 
question wording was found to bias results across the entire age range investigated.  
The findings raise problems for the interpretation of previous work into children 
teleological explanations. Research using teleologically-biased questions or 
explanations to elicit children’s explanations about the natural world is likely to have 
been influenced by the impact of purposeful-statements. For example, ‘does Y help X?’, 
‘is it better for X to have Y?’ (Keil, 1995), ‘what is X for?’, ‘is X for Y, or not?’ 
(Kelemen, 1999a), ‘is X useful for something?’ (Kampourakis et al., 2012). Even if 
children have been given the option to decline to answer, suggest it was a strange 
question or eschew an explanation that contained a teleological bias, they are still 
exposed to teleologically-biased language. Children can be prompted by the leading 
phrases used in leading and multiple-choice questions or may refrain from stating that 
do not know an answer if they could relate a topic to a purpose for which it could be 
used. 
From an educational point of view this finding indicates that the language used 
to phrase questions or explanations about scientific topics can place demand 
characteristics upon respondents. Employing purposeful language (willingly or 
unwillingly) leads children into providing teleological explanations. This is problematic 
as children’s ability to talk, and think, about scientific concepts rests, at least in part, on 
their understanding of scientific terminology (Dawes, 2004). Consequently, educators 
must model for children how to use language to question, analyse and communicate 
ideas. This is particularly pertinent to young children as the focus of Early Years 
science education ‘is to enable pupils to experience and observe phenomena, looking 
more closely at the natural […] world around them’ (DfE, 2013, p. 146). The 
implications for assessment are clear; the findings support calls for the use of open 
questions in research into children’s explanations (Kampourakis et al., 2012). Children 
should not be inadvertently prompted into explaining natural phenomena as purposeful 
or agentic, and therefore, the use of teleological-leading language is serious concern. 
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It is suggested that teleological explanations are caused by exposure to 
intentional artefacts (Kelemen, 1999a) and by religious education (Lindeman et al., 
2015). Demand characteristics placed upon children by teleologically-leading language 
can now be added to this list. While not an independent cause it appears to be an 
exacerbating factor. Teleologically-worded questions may intensify children’s 
tendencies to provide teleological explanations, to propose purpose where there is none. 
Influence of topic 
The results show that the topic of the question can have a considerable influence on 
response type, with the proportion of teleological responses (within the open-treatment 
data set) ranging from 25% for rainbows to 88% for waterfalls. Three out of ten topics 
of natural phenomena significantly differed to the weighted-mean level for the category 
of natural phenomena. For waterfalls children were more likely to provide teleological 
explanations than is suggested by the category weighted-mean score, whereas the topics 
of rainbows and storms received significantly more scientific explanations that was 
suggested by the mean value for natural phenomena. This suggests that teleological 
reasoning is not consistent within the ontological category. 
This finding has two main implications. First, it could be inferred that children’s 
explanations for natural phenomena support the ‘promiscuous’ teleology stance. 58.4% 
of children's total explanations, when averaged across topics, were teleological, close to 
Kelemen's (1999a) findings of ~70% teleological explanations for natural objects. 
However, that conclusion would be misleading. When averaged across topics children 
may employ teleology for the category of natural phenomena, but the results of this 
study suggest that their application of teleology is more nuanced. Children provided 
significantly different numbers of teleological explanations depending upon the topic 
they were explaining. Within the category of natural phenomena, children displayed 
selective-teleology, not promiscuous-teleology. Consequently, caution needs to be taken 
interpreting the results of studies if they used only a limited number of topics, as 
depending upon the topics investigated studies may have over, or under, estimated 
children's teleological tendencies. 
The second implication relates to the structure of knowledge about the natural 
world. It was postulated that that understanding the nature of children’s naïve ideas can 
be informed by exploring if there was a) within-child variation across contexts and b) 
across-child variation across contexts. Looking at response type (teleological vs 
scientific, and design- vs relation-teleology discussed in the next section) it would 
appear that across the range of topics, children’s responses did exhibit reasonable 
variation within children (i.e. a child varied in response type across the range of topics) 
and b) exhibited variation across children (i.e. the participants provided a range of 
varied response types for any given topic). Consequently, children’s naïve ideas about 
the causes of Natural Phenomena are argued to be a form of fragmented knowledge. If 
children’s knowledge about natural phenomena is fragmented it would indicate a 
diminished barrier to learning, as following diSessa’s argument, conceptual change 
would require the incremental reshaping of targeted knowledge elements. It is viewed as 
a diminished barrier not because teleology is less of a problem but because a 
fragmented construction suggests a new way of tackling the barrier that is teleology. 
Teleological thought and explanation does not need to be entirely eradicated in young 
children’s discourse. Rather through the gradual reframing of elements of children’s 
ideas, educators could gradually ‘chip away’ at children’s preconceptions which result 
in teleological explanation. This could be achieved through target interventions, for 
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example where individuals learn when and where teleological explanation is appropriate 
(e.g. learning heuristics, Zohar & Ginossar, 1998). 
Type of teleology 
With regards to type of teleology, the results show that, overall and by treatment type, 
there is an approximate 3:7 split for design-teleology and relational-teleology. 
Consequently, for the topics investigated in this category of natural phenomena 
children's teleological explanations are more likely to be relational than to exhibit 
design-teleology. Furthermore, there is an influence of topic, as certain topics were 
significantly more likely to be explained via relational-teleology (day, light, night and 
snow) rather than design-teleology (storms). This variation in type of teleological 
explanation across individuals and topics supports the claims made above about the 
fragmented structure of naïve knowledge about the causes of natural phenomena.  
These results indicate that the majority of children's teleological explanations 
advocate relational-teleology rather than design-teleology, and the finding is applicable 
to the majority of natural phenomena investigated. The results of this study provide 
empirical support for the suggestions made by ojalehto et al. (2013) and the notion that 
children express relational-teleology. The implication of this finding is that teleology 
may be less of a developmental problem than previously proposed. If children are using 
relational-teleology instead of the usually referred to design-teleology it suggests that 
when children provide teleological explanations that they may not always be expressing 
a fervent belief that a something exists for a specific purpose but rather discussing it in 
relation to how it could be used. Perhaps, therefore, relational-teleology is a cultural 
method of describing natural phenomena, a natural pattern of language, similar to the 
explanations given by high-school students in the study by Zohar & Ginossar (1998). It 
is not necessary a specific belief that X exists for a purpose, but rather a style of 
discourse about X. That is, children participate in discussion around natural phenomena 
which considers them in relation to an effect which they have, or a purpose for which 
they can be co-opted; for example, a child may not believe rain is for watering the grass 
but may use this explanation due to prior discussion where rain is discussed in relation 
to it watering the grass. Consequently, it is possible that relational-teleology indicates 
that some teleological explanations may be due to certain patterns of language whereby 
children relate natural phenomena to a purpose for which it could be used, further 
empirical work exploring children’s naturally-occurring discourse is needed to support 
this argument. 
Conclusion 
Has there been an overestimation of young children teleological tendencies? Children 
do display a strong bias towards providing teleological explanations for natural 
phenomena. However, the results of this study suggest a more complicated picture.  
Firstly, children can be influenced by the way in which questions are worded, 
resulting in an overestimation of children’s teleological responses. Secondly, children's 
teleological explanations are not consistent within the ontological category of natural 
phenomena, with certain questioned topics being more likely to be explained 
teleological, or scientifically, than others. Thirdly, sub-categorisation of teleological 
explanation suggests a more nuanced understanding of teleology. The majority of topics 
of natural phenomena provoked responses classified as relational-teleology. This 
finding does not match the commonly used definition of teleology, which implies 
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design-teleology. Consequently, when children espouse these purposeful explanations 
they may simply be using teleological language as a descriptive tool to explain how a 
topic could be used (similar to many popular science books, Hanke, 2004, and 
educational textbooks, Zohar & Ginossar, 1998; Talanquer, 2007). The variation in 
response type (both scientific vs teleological and design- vs relational-teleology) across 
the topics suggests that naïve ideas, children’s preconceptions and knowledge about 
natural phenomena may have a fragmented structure. A fragmented view of knowledge 
might imply that teleological explanation can be limited using target interventions, 
focusing on the big idea that nature is causal not purposeful, a concept which can be 
applied to any topic. A question raised from these findings is how can we develop 
methods to limit children's acceptance and use of teleological explanations for the 
existence of natural kinds?  
Confining the topics to the category of natural phenomena is a limitation of this 
study, and further research is needed to confirm if the results are applicable to different 
ontological categories. However, taken together these findings suggest that teleology 
may not be the major barrier it has been claimed to be, but the high number of 
teleological responses for both question wordings and all topics certainly suggests it is 
still a considerable hurdle.  
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Supplementary Table 1 
Examples of teleological explanations for darkness 
 
  
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there is darkness …) 
Darkness is an aid for helping 
people to go to sleep 
“because you don’t always need light […] 
because, like, if you tried to sleep and it was 
sunny it would be a bit too light” 
Darkness is for scaring people  “for being scared” 
Darkness is for nocturnal animals “so the night animals get a turn to come out” 
Darkness is a time for celestial 
bodies to appear 
“for the starts to come out” 
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Supplementary Table 2 
Examples of teleological explanations for day 
 
  
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there is day …) 
Day is for helping people to see “so you can see and people don’t have to walk in 
the night time cos you can’t see very well in the 
night” 
Day is for children to go to school “for going to school, so you can learn lots of 
things” 
Day is for children to play “for us all to be active and run about” 
Day is for waking people up “for telling us to wake up, cos day is for being 
awake not asleep” 
Day is for people to go to work “for people to go out, like, if they need to get to 
work” 
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Supplementary Table 3 
Examples of teleological explanations for light 
 
  
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there is light …) 
Light is for helping people to 
wake up 
“so everyone knows it is daylight so they will get 
up” 
Light is for supporting plant 
growth 
“so that the plants can go” 
Light is for enabling people to see “so people can see better cos if it’s, like, dark 
you’d be, like, bashing into lampposts” 
This is the authored accepted version of 10.1080/09500693.2018.1451008. 
 
Supplementary Table 4 
Examples of teleological explanations for night 
 
 
  
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there is night …) 
Night is for nocturnal animals “so, like, the insects can come out at night, like, 
slugs worms and those slugs with shells” 
Night is a time for people to go to 
sleep 
“so you can get some rest from all the things you 
have done in the day” 
Night is a time for celestial bodies 
to appear 
“for the stars and the moon to come out” 
This is the authored accepted version of 10.1080/09500693.2018.1451008. 
 
Supplementary Table 5 
Examples of teleological explanations for rain 
 
 
  
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there is rain …) 
Rain is for supporting plant 
growth 
“for keeping all the plants, grass and flowers 
healthy” 
Rain is for animals “so animals can drink it, like, if there is a little 
hole where it goes” 
Rain is for children to use in play “so people can play in it, in case you want to jump 
up and down in puddles” 
Rain is for washing “for, like, washing your car and washing stuff.” 
This is the authored accepted version of 10.1080/09500693.2018.1451008. 
 
Supplementary Table 6 
Examples of teleological explanations for rainbows 
 
  
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there are rainbows …) 
Rainbows are for aesthetic 
pleasure 
“for making people happy” 
Rainbows are for marking 
treasure 
“so that people might think that that there is 
treasure at the end of the rainbow” 
This is the authored accepted version of 10.1080/09500693.2018.1451008. 
 
Supplementary Table 7 
Examples of teleological explanations for snow 
 
 
  
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there is snow …) 
Snow is a substance which 
facilitates Christmas 
“there’s snow cos you know […] it needs to be 
snowing or no one would know it was Christmas” 
Snow is for children to use in play “basically, so children could build snowmans and 
play snowball fights” 
Snow is for animals “so some animals can live in snow” 
Snow is for cooling people down  “it is because […] otherwise everyday it would be 
hot and we’d would get burnt” 
Snow is for filling bodies of water “so when it melts you can use the water in water 
fountains, ponds, lake and sometimes people 
chuck it in the sea and then add a bit of salt. Put a 
bit of salt in it and chuck it in the sea” 
This is the authored accepted version of 10.1080/09500693.2018.1451008. 
 
Supplementary Table 8 
Examples of teleological explanations for storms 
 
 
  
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there are storms …) 
Storms are for producing water “to make more rain, so you can get more water” 
Storms are for supporting plant 
growth 
“we have rain specially for the plants” 
This is the authored accepted version of 10.1080/09500693.2018.1451008. 
 
Supplementary Table 9 
Examples of teleological explanations for waterfalls 
 
 
  
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there are waterfalls…) 
Waterfalls are for providing 
humans with water 
“so you can get water’” 
Waterfalls are for providing 
animals with water 
“to make water for the animals that are in the 
wild” 
Waterfalls are for aesthetic 
pleasure 
“to make the place look even nicer with a little 
waterfall or a big waterfall” 
Waterfalls are for children’s play “so people can swim in it” 
This is the authored accepted version of 10.1080/09500693.2018.1451008. 
 
Supplementary Table 10 
Examples of teleological explanations for waves 
 
 
Theme of teleological explanation Example (there are waves …) 
Waves are for aiding sea life “cos if there was no waves […] the animals that 
live in the sea won’t be able to move.” 
Waves are for children’s play “for making the sea more fun, so people can go on 
the skateboard, like surfing on it” 
